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LECTURE
THE  RULE  OF  LAW  AND  THE  JUDICIAL
FUNCTION  IN  THE  WORLD TODAY
Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain*
INTRODUCTION
Good evening.1  It is a pleasure to be here at the University of Notre
Dame London Law Centre, and I am deeply honored to have been asked to
speak from the “Judge James J. Clynes, Jr., Visiting Chair in the Ethics of
Litigation within the Judicial Process.”  The ethics of litigation, of course, is
not just for practitioners.  It is also for judges.  It is for that reason that the
Clynes Chair has, as one of its concerns, the “practice of handling and resolv-
ing cases, both at the trial and appellate levels.”  While I wish to offer today
some observations on that practice, I will not address it directly and at once,
as would be my tendency as a judge.  Rather—this being a scholarly affair—I
will do my best to proceed as would an academic, taking up the question
obliquely, incrementally, and only after addressing a more abstract subject to
which I have lately been giving much thought: namely, that universally
invoked term the Rule of Law.
I
The world’s oldest written constitution still in effect has many inspiring
lines, but perhaps the one that most stirs the souls of the patriotic appears in
© 2014 Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may
reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the
Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* United States Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Chairman, Committee on International Judicial Relations of the Judicial Conference of the
United States.  Judge James J. Clynes, Jr., Visiting Chair in the Ethics of Litigation within
the Judicial Process, University of Notre Dame Law School.  Lecture delivered on February
21, 2013, at the University of Notre Dame–London Law Centre.
1 The views expressed herein are my own and do not necessarily reflect the view of my
colleagues, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, or the Judicial Con-
ference of the United States.  I wish to acknowledge, with thanks, the assistance of Ryan
Walsh, my law clerk, in preparing these remarks.
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Article 30.2  Delineating a familiar separation of powers, that Article forbids
the legislative, executive, and judicial branches from swapping or mixing
functions.  “[T]o that end”—and here’s the line—“it may be a government of
laws and not of men.”3  John Adams, the author of that line and most of the
rest of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, penned
those words in 1779, eight years before the adoption of the second oldest
written constitution still in effect.  Writing just over twenty years later, the
great Chief Justice John Marshall would affirm, in Marbury v. Madison, that
“[t]he government of the United States has been emphatically termed a gov-
ernment of laws, and not of men.”4  Of course, neither Adams nor Marshall
was on to something new with this “government of laws” notion.  The idea
that law, rather than certain men, ought to govern men—or, put differently,
that men ought to self-govern through law—is quite old.  In Western civiliza-
tion, it is as old as political philosophy itself.
We invoke it still today, perhaps more vociferously than ever before.
From the lips of Socrates and the quill of Chief Justice Marshall, the principle
of the Rule of Law now takes center stage in the theater of international
relations.  This is no doubt because, as a global community, we are painfully
aware that the Rule of Law has had some bad years of late—indeed, a bad
century.  In the concentration camps of Nazi Germany, the gulags of Soviet
Russia, the killing fields of Cambodia, and the genocidal wastelands of
Kosovo, the Rule of Law was nowhere to be found (though perhaps, with
enough searching, one could uncover its remains—it has a way, after all, of
being tyranny’s first victim).  The nightmare of the twentieth century having
passed, we naturally wish to do all that we can to ensure that such tragedies
never happen again.  As most recognize, that project begins and ends with
understanding, spreading, and strengthening the Rule of Law in every corner
of the globe.
A
Spearheading the rhetorical effort on this front lately has been, perhaps
surprisingly to some, the United Nations itself.  Last September, I had the
fortune of attending the historic High Level Meeting on the Rule of Law of
the 67th Session of the U.N. General Assembly.  At that session, leaders from
more than eighty countries gathered to reiterate not only their own commit-
ments to the Rule of Law but to reaffirm our commitment as a global com-
munity to that principle.  To that end, the General Assembly adopted a
declaration.5  “[T]he rule of law,” it reads in part, “applies to all States
equally” and ought to “accord predictability and legitimacy to their actions.”6
2 MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXX.
3 Id. (emphasis added).
4 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
5 G.A. Res. 67/1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/67/1 (Nov. 30, 2012).
6 Id. ¶ 2.
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The Rule of Law, it also says, entails democracy, independent judiciaries, and
the securing of human rights.7
This is heartening language.  Still, it is just language.  And perhaps,
given the events surrounding the meeting, we ought not to be all that
encouraged by it.  After all, while diplomats in New York were busy reading
listlessly from their prepared statements, the death toll in Syria climbed to
25,0008 and, just a week before, terrorists in Benghazi, Libya destroyed an
American diplomatic mission.9  In addition, Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad, billed to speak at the U.N. that day on the very subject of the
Rule of Law, took the opportunity instead to condemn the West and repeat-
edly to insult Israel.10  To many commentators, these were indications that,
indeed, something more than high-soaring language was necessary to edify
the Rule of Law worldwide.  As a writer for The Guardian newspaper put it, “in
the end, world leaders fell short.  After more than a year of planning, all they
could muster was another day of talk.”11  He continued, “It did not have to
be this way.  Back in March, [U.N. Secretary General] Ban Ki-moon had pro-
posed much more. . . . The secretary general [had] called for clear goals,
with benchmarks to measure progress.”12  Instead, all we got was a flimsy,
content-light “declaration.”13
Louise Arbour, former U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, also
expressed bewilderment, but she offered a different diagnosis.14  The prob-
lem, she wrote, was not that the U.N. or the Secretary General had lacked the
spine to take concrete action toward the advancement of the Rule of Law.  It
was, instead, that the whole idea of the Rule of Law, framed so abstractly and
described so generically, is a non-starter.15  “Everyone believes in [the Rule of
Law] and wants to promote it.  But . . . it is doubtful that states even agree
what the term really means,” she argues.16  “Do-gooders and democrats try to
convince dictators to improve [the] rule of law,” she continues, “while repres-
sive regimes are more than happy to refer to ‘rule of law’ as they crack down
on dissent at home.”17  In this critique, the Rule of Law is nothing more than
an ideological Rorschach Test.  A totalitarian looks at it and sees the need for
7 Id. ¶¶ 5, 13.
8 James A. Goldston, UN Meeting on the Rule of Law Was Just Another Day of Talk, THE
GUARDIAN (Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/law/2012/sep/26/united-
nations-rule-of-law-talk.
9 Greg Miller & Michael Birnbaum, Chaos at U.S. Consulate in Libya, WASH. POST, Sept.
13, 2012, at A1.
10 Rick Gladstone & Neil MacFarquhar, Iran’s President Spreads the Outrage in New York,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2012, at A9.
11 Goldston, supra note 8.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Louise Arbour, The Rule of Law, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/09/27/opinion/UN-general-assembly-on-the-rule-of-law.html.
15 Id.
16 Id. (emphasis added).
17 Id.
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severe laws, uniformly enforced.  An egalitarian, by contrast, reads it to call
for the universal provision and enforcement of all manner of “human
rights”—rights to health care, rights to education, and all the rest.18
B
I have witnessed this confusion first hand through my work as chairman
of the Committee on International Judicial Relations of the Judicial Branch
of the United States Government.  Established in 1992 by the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States, the Committee endeavors to foster the Rule of Law
throughout the world.19  In fact, our panel of federal judges was formed for
the express purpose of “respond[ing] to the growing number of requests for
judicial assistance in newly emerging democracies and developing coun-
tries.”20  In my conversations with judges and political officials in these
nations, though, I have encountered mixed conceptions of precisely what the
Rule of Law is.  I recall one gentleman positing that the Rule of Law was a
negative thing, an authoritarian principle by which, through the trappings of
legality, dictators carry out their evil fiats—call it “Rule of Law, heavy on the
‘rule.’”  To others, it represents nothing more than Americanism in the worst
sense of the word: an effort by our country to re-create other societies in our
own image, with something like our Constitution, our Bill of Rights, our divi-
sion of powers, and all the rest.  If this is the Rule of Law, some would rather
do without it.
But these, of course, are misconceptions.  The Rule of Law is not a
license for tyranny, be it an out-and-out tyranny or even a tyranny conferring
myriad procedural rights and safeguards.  Nor is it simply repackaged
Americanism.
C
But then, what exactly do we mean by the Rule of Law?  Let’s briefly
survey two accounts of the concept.  The first is perhaps as close to an inter-
national, twenty-first-century consensus as we have managed to achieve: The
World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index.21  The second—and, here, I must
beg the pardon of the philosophers and historians in the audience—is my
own boiled-down account of the Rule-of-Law principle as developed through
our civilization’s intellectual history, particularly as that concept relates to the
judicial function.
18 See id.
19 INT’L JUDICIAL REL. OFFICE, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER ASSISTANCE
TO OTHER NATIONS TO IMPROVE THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (n.d.).
20 Id.
21 MARK DAVID AGRAST ET AL., THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX
2012–2013 (2013).
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II. MEASURING THE RULE OF LAW TODAY: THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT’S
RULE OF LAW INDEX
The World Justice Project, founded in 2006 as an independent, non-
profit organization, has as its sole mission the “advance[ment of] the rule of
law around the world.”22  The Rule of Law, as the Project understands it, is
important not because it has any inherent moral worth, but because history
has proven it so often to be instrumentally useful: “Without the rule of law,
medicines do not reach health facilities due to corruption; women in rural
areas remain unaware of their rights; people are killed in criminal violence;
and firms’ costs increase because of expropriation risk,” it tells us.23  Conse-
quently, “[s]trengthening the rule of law is a major goal of governments,
donors, businesses, and civil society organizations around the world.”24
Capable of being realized, the Rule of Law as applied must in some
sense also be measurable.  And, if that’s so, the Index reasons, we would do
well to measure it, if only to determine how various regimes stack up and to
encourage them all to do better: “[R]ule of law development requires clarity
about the fundamental features of the rule of law as well as an adequate basis
for its evaluation and measurement.”25  In an effort to furnish such clarity
and to provide such a basis, the World Justice Project has set out—now for
the third time—to provide the world with a “quantitative assessment tool
designed to offer a comprehensive picture of the extent to which countries
adhere to the rule of law in practice.”26  Armed with data collected through
extensive general-population polling and expert questionnaires, the Index
scores ninety-seven countries on forty-eight different “rule of law indicators
organized around nine conceptual dimensions.”27
A
Before examining those dimensions and indicators, I should first high-
light the Index’s four “universal principles” of the Rule of Law from which the
numerous dimensions and indicators are derived.  First, “[t]he government
and its officials and agents . . . are accountable under the law.”28  Second,
“[t]he laws are clear, publicized, stable, and just, . . . and protect fundamen-
tal rights.”29  Third, “[t]he process by which the laws are enacted, adminis-
tered, and enforced is accessible, fair, and efficient.”30  Finally, “[j]ustice is
delivered timely by competent, ethical, and independent representatives and
22 Id. at 1.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 3.
29 Id.
30 Id.
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neutrals who are of sufficient number, have adequate resources, and reflect
the makeup of the communities they serve.”31
From these rudiments, the Index derives the following specific princi-
ples.  First, the Rule of Law means limited government powers.32  Those pow-
ers must be “defined in the fundamental law” and limited by both the
legislature and the judiciary.33  Officials “are sanctioned for misconduct,”
and transitions of power are “subject to the law.”34  Second, the Rule of Law
requires an “absence of corruption”; public office must not be used for pri-
vate gain of any sort.35  Third, the Rule of Law entails “order and security.”36
Fourth, it requires the recognition and protection of “fundamental rights,”
such as equal protection, the right to life and security, due process, freedom
of expression, religion, assembly, privacy, and labor.37  Fifth, the Rule of Law
requires an “open government” whose laws are publicized, accessible, and
stable.38  Sixth, the Rule of Law calls for effective “regulatory enforcement,”
unaccompanied by “unreasonably” delayed administrative processes.39  Sev-
enth, the Rule of Law must provide “civil justice” and, eighth, criminal jus-
tice, both of which must be non-discriminatory, corruption-free, accessible,
impartial, timely, and effective.40  Ninth and finally, the Rule of Law means
the availability of “informal justice,” which, like formal justice, also must be
timely, effective, impartial, free of corruption, and must “respect[ ] and pro-
tect[ ] fundamental rights.”41
B
This is an impressive list—impressive in its breadth, impressive in its
ecumenism, and impressive as an intuitively sensible set of metrics against
which to measure the political systems of the world.  Still, parts of it perhaps
ought to give us pause, triggering our curiosity and even our skepticism.  In
that spirit, I offer the following observations.  First, note that, though the first
factor requires a “fundamental” law, it does not explicitly call for a written
fundamental law—and it avoids the term “constitution” altogether.42  Sec-
ond, it calls for the recognition of not only a set of process-based rights (such
as due process of law) but also a handful of individual, substantive entitle-
ments—the right to privacy, the right to opinion, and “labor rights.”43
31 Id.
32 Id. at 11.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
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Third, although it calls for laws that are known, accessible, and stable, it does
not demand the same degree of openness and certainty from regulations.
Instead, regulations need only be fairly made, effectively enforced, and prop-
erly applied.44  Fourth, note that civil justice, in this account, must not only
be available to all—it also must be financially affordable for all.45  Fifth, and
perhaps most striking to the American eye, the Index’s Rule of Law need not
go hand in hand with one particular form of government.  Indeed, on the
issue whether the “laws” it repeatedly describes are to be enacted by demo-
cratically elected representatives, the Index explicitly punts.46  Between aris-
tocracy and republicanism, oligarchy and monarchy, the Index is neutral.
These points are worth keeping in mind as we turn in a few moments to the
historical conception of the Rule of Law.  Near the end of my lecture, I hope
to circle back to a couple of these points and evaluate them in light of the
Rule-of-Law principle as traditionally understood.
C
By the way, how did the United States fare under the Index’s standard?
Surprisingly, not exceptionally well.  On “limited government powers,” the
United States comes in at seventeenth place,47 trailing Denmark (at first
place),48 Sweden (at second),49 Germany (at ninth),50 France (at elev-
enth),51 and the United Kingdom (at thirteenth).52  On “absence of corrup-
tion,” we come in one place worse,53 again trailing Sweden,54 Denmark,55
Norway56—the gold, silver, and bronze on this factor—as well as Singa-
pore,57 Japan,58 the United Kingdom,59 and others.60  On “fundamental
rights,” the United States ranks twenty-fifth.61  On “open government,” the
United States clinches thirteenth—our highest mark.62  On regulatory
enforcement, civil justice, and criminal justice, the United States falls some-
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 12.
47 Id. at 150.
48 Id. at 82.
49 Id. at 141.
50 Id. at 92.
51 Id. at 90.
52 Id. at 149–50.
53 Id. at 150.
54 Id. at 141.
55 Id. at 82.
56 Id. at 123.
57 Id. at 136.
58 Id. at 103.
59 Id. at 149.
60 Id. at 150.
61 Id.
62 Id.
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where between nineteenth and twenty-sixth.63  Summing all this up, the
Index concludes that America scores well on limited government, because of
our “well-functioning system of checks and balances,” as well as on funda-
mental rights.64  Still, we “lag[ ] behind” for failing to provide disadvantaged
persons access to the legal system: “[T]he gap between rich and poor individ-
uals in terms of both actual use of and satisfaction with the civil court system
is significant,” according to the Index.65  Finally, “there is a perception that
ethnic minorities and foreigners receive unequal treatment.”66  Although we
Americans would like to think that we deserve better marks, it is obvious that,
by the Index’s yardstick, there is much room for improvement.
III. THE RULE OF LAW IN WESTERN THOUGHT: FROM PLATO TO THE
MAGNA CARTA
But then, is the World Justice Project’s standard the right one?  Having
put the question on the table, let’s now briefly overview the distinctly Western
conception of the Rule of Law.  In the course of doing so, we ought to high-
light in particular those characteristics of the Rule of Law that relate espe-
cially to courts and the role of the judge in civil society.  Before beginning, I
should note that I focus on the principle of the Rule of Law in Western his-
tory both because I am a Westerner and because the tradition of the West has
a good deal to say on the subject.  But that, of course, is not to say that the
East and its history bear no relevance here.  Given my limited time, I think it
best to leave the subject of comparable Asian insights on the Rule of Law for
another lecture.
A
It was “once said that all philosophy is but a footnote to Plato.”67  The
philosophy of the Rule of Law is no exception.  What is perhaps most surpris-
ing about Plato’s account is his argument that the Rule of Law, as a theoreti-
cal matter, is a mere second-best political system.68  Better to be ruled not by
a mechanical, impersonal code, but by the virtuous and wise.  “Rule of law
[per Plato] is inferior to the rule of living intelligence,” the philosopher Leo
Strauss explained, “because laws, owing to their generality, cannot determine
wisely what is right and proper in all circumstances given the infinite variety
of circumstances.”69  Nonetheless, laws are necessary.  This is not simply
63 Id.  For the raw scores of the United States and comparative nations, see id. at
162–77.
64 Id. at 28–29.
65 Id. at 29.
66 Id.
67 2 THE DICTIONARY OF MODERN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHERS 613 (John R. Shook ed.,
2005) (quoting Alfred North Whitehead).
68 See generally PLATO, THE LAWS OF PLATO (Thomas L. Pangle trans., 1988) (1980)
(translating Plato’s work on law).
69 Leo Strauss, Plato, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 33, 74–75 (Leo Strauss &
Joseph Cropsey eds., 3d ed. 1987).
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because, in Plato’s account, polities will always be lacking in wise men, but
rather because “[t]he few wise men cannot sit beside each of the many
unwise men and tell him exactly what it is becoming for him to do.”70  In any
event, the wise men are often hard to find, and, when found, they often pre-
fer not to rule.71  The unwise, for their part, are disinclined to believe that a
wise man deserving to rule over them would in fact be willing and able to do
so.72  Thus, where the only other alternative is the “lawless rule of selfish
men,”73 they instead settle on the Rule of Law, which—even though inferior
to the wise man’s intelligence—commands his respect.74
So, too, we find in Aristotle the argument that the Rule of Law, like
politics generally, is a reflection of the nature of things and the nature of
man in particular.  Man is made for the “polis” or the city because he, unique
among the animals, possesses reason.75
“It is the peculiarity of man . . . in comparison with the rest of the animal
world, that he alone possesses a perception of good and evil, of the just and
the unjust; . . . and it is association in [a common perception] of these things
which makes a family and a polis.”76
Understood this way, writes the incomparable Oxford (and Notre Dame)
Professor John Finnis,
[T]he Rule of Law is a virtue of human interaction and community. . . .
Individuals can only be selves—i.e. have the “dignity” of being “responsible
agents”—if they are not made to live their lives for the convenience of others
but are allowed and assisted to create a subsisting identity across a
“lifetime.”77
It is in this sense that, perhaps contrary to the World Justice Project’s under-
standing,78 the Rule of Law has a moral worth in its own right, not simply as a
means to some other desired end.79  Taking the point further, Aristotle
70 Id. at 75.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 This is to avoid the risk that the less wise, imitating their betters, will also think it
permissible to disobey the law.  Plato goes on to note that because there is always a risk that
the laws, as handed down and enforced, will reflect the sectional interests of their authors
or enforcers, it is best that there be not a pure monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy, but
instead a “regime must be mixed.” Id. at 83.
75 HADLEY ARKES, FIRST THINGS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
JUSTICE 12–14 (1986).
76 Id. at 14 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Aristotle).
77 JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 272 (2d ed. 2011).
78 See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text.
79 Following Aristotle, Princeton University Professor Robert P. George writes,
[T]he dignity that calls forth the respect due to rational agents in the form of . . .
governance in accordance with the rule of law flows from our nature as . . . beings
whose nature is to understand and act on more-than-merely-instrumental reasons.
The capacity to understand and act on such reasons stands in a relationship of
mutual entailment with the human capacity for free choice, that is, our capacity
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argues that it is not only man’s capacity for reason, but also the fact that men
are equally capable of reason, that necessitates the Rule of Law, when he says,
[H]e who bids the law rule may be deemed to bid God and Reason alone
rule, but he who bids man rule adds an element of the beast; for desire is a
wild beast, and passion perverts the minds of rulers, even when they are the
best of men.  The law is reason unaffected by desire.80
In this account, it is especially important what kind of person is applying the
law, for the law does not apply itself.  He who applies the law—he who,
through his art, makes the general principles of the law govern the particular
circumstances of a given case—must do so without passion and with reason.
B
Continuing this thread on the Rule of Law and the law “applier,” we
turn to the great Roman orator Cicero, who sketches a telling comparison
between the despotic king, on the one hand, and the “magistrate,” on the
other.81  In so doing, he highlights the importance of judicial independence
to the Rule of Law.82  The tyrannical king who frees himself of the strictures
of law, Cicero writes, also by that act unravels “every civilized partnership with
his own citizens and indeed with the entire human species.”83  Contrast the
magistrate, whose “function is to take charge and to issue directives which are
right, beneficial, and in accordance with the laws.  As magistrates are subject
to the laws, the people are subject to the magistrates.”84  And here’s the most
important line: “In fact it is true to say that a magistrate is a speaking law, and
law a silent magistrate.”85  Here, we see the judge as a law-speaker, though not
in an active sense but a passive one.  The judge—whose name, personality, or
predilections could not for these purposes be any less relevant—opens his
mouth and “law” issues forth.  Note that, in this account of judicial indepen-
dence, it doesn’t necessarily matter whether a judge comes to serve through
appointment, wins his seat in an election, or serves at the pleasure of a minis-
ter or cabinet-level secretary.  Although those details likely would bear some
real-world influence on the ways in which a particular judge carries out his
role (namely, whether he does it well or poorly), none is a necessary precon-
dition to the judge’s role with respect to maintaining the Rule of Law.
to deliberate and choose between or among open possibilities (i.e., options) that are
provided by “basic human goods,” i.e., more-than-merely-instrumental reasons.
Robert P. George, Reason, Freedom, and the Rule of Law: Their Significance in the Natural Law
Tradition, 46 AM. J. JURIS. 249, 255 (2001).
80 ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS 88 (Stephen Everson
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996).
81 CICERO, THE REPUBLIC, reprinted in THE REPUBLIC AND THE LAWS, bk. 2, §§ 47–49,
53–54, at 50–52 (Niall Rudd trans., 1998).
82 See CICERO, THE LAWS, reprinted in THE REPUBLIC AND THE LAWS, supra note 81, bk. 3,
§§ 2–3, at 4 (discussing the authority of the magistrate with regard to the law).
83 CICERO, supra note 81, bk. 2, § 48, at 50.
84 CICERO, supra note 82, bk. 3, § 2, at 151.
85 Id. (emphasis added).
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Rather, Cicero’s only requirement is that a magistrate’s judgments be “right,
beneficial, and in accordance with the laws.”86
And, of course, his decision must matter; it must take effect.  On this
point, I offer a brief aside: in a speech given several years ago, Chief Justice of
the United States John Roberts shared a conversation he had had with a for-
eign judge at a conference.87  The judge asked the Chief Justice whether he
ever had ruled against the government.  The Chief Justice said yes, of course.
The foreign judge leaned in, seeming a bit shocked, and asked, “What hap-
pened?”  The Chief Justice was confused.  “Well, nothing happened,” he
responded.  The foreign judge nodded in confirmation: “Yes, that would be
the case in our country as well.”  The Chief Justice picked up on the miscom-
munication and clarified: “No no, the government, of course, complied with
the ruling of the court.”  “Of course,” the Chief said, but the point wasn’t at
all obvious to the foreign judge.88
C
Skipping ahead some 1300 years from the time of Cicero, we reach the
next major milestone in the development of the Rule-of-Law principle: the
Magna Carta of 1215.  That document is notable for three reasons.  First, as
Professor Brian Tamanaha of St. John’s University points out, the Magna
Carta codified a principle that had, until then, been relegated mostly to dusty
old texts of philosophy: namely, the idea that the law ruled not only men, but
the king.89  Second, the Magna Carta is significant as an early experiment in
constitutionalism.  “The English long held a myth about an ancient unwritten
constitution based upon customary law and understandings,” Tamanaha
writes.90  “The Magna Carta added a foundational written piece.”91  Third,
the Magna Carta provided in its famous Clause 39 the guarantee that “No
free man shall be taken, imprisoned, disseised, outlawed, banished, or in any
way destroyed, nor will We proceed against or prosecute him, except by the
lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the land.”92  Of course, this
phrase, “the law of the land,” later came to be synonymous with another
legalism more familiar to our ears, and universally regarded as essential to
the Rule of Law: “due process of law.”93
Another remarkable quality of that monumental document is that it is
indeed a document.  One wonders whether we would be praising the Magna
86 Id.
87 John G. Roberts, Reagan Lecture (C-SPAN America and the Courts television broad-
cast Mar. 8, 2006), available at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/ReaganLec.
88 Id.
89 BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW 27 (2004).
90 Id. at 26. 
91 Id.
92 Magna Carta of 1215, cl. 39, reprinted in A.E. DICK HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA: TEXT &
COMMENTARY 45 (rev. ed. 1998) (emphasis added).
93 See Gary Lawson, Due Process Clause, in THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION
337–38 (Edwin Meese III et al. eds., 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Carta’s guarantees 800 years later if they hadn’t been codified.  Would we still
count 1215 a watershed year for the development of the Rule of Law had
King John’s concessions been made orally and enforced through the genera-
tions only as a kind of unwritten law?
D
A more abstract question that such a counterfactual raises is this: Can
the Rule of Law obtain in either a civil-law or common-law system?  The short
answer, it seems, is that the Rule of Law is compatible with either regime;
still, both pose risks.  The advantages of a civil-law system, to our modern
democratic sensibilities, seem obvious enough.  Once codified, a rule takes
on a static, permanent quality.  It becomes predictable—we can plan our lives
around it.  And, of course, we may come to know it; it can be “looked up.”  It
was with at least some of these considerations in mind that the Roman
Emperor Justinian had his subordinates collect and systematize the existing
customs, rules, decisions, and legal commentaries of Rome into a three-vol-
ume legal code.94  Fast-forwarding several hundred years, we find the most
full-throated defense of the principles underlying the Justinian Code in the
political writings of the Enlightenment.  The chief virtue of codified law, the
philosopher Jeremy Bentham contended, is that it replaces the common
law’s vagaries with clear directives, appropriately promotes the legislative,
political role in law-development, and makes the law accessible to the general
public, not just to specialists.95  In other words, the argument went, codified
law—if not strictly necessary to the Rule of Law—is at least extremely impor-
tant to it.
At the same time, civil-law systems also pose risks to the Rule of Law,
threatening to enfeeble it in indirect ways.  First, consider that, as a historical
matter, the rise of civil law has often gone hand in hand with a systematic
demotion of unwritten “fundamental law,” whether natural or constitutional.
This is because—to defenders of the civil law, many of whom have been stu-
dents of the legal positivist school—law is a strictly man-made thing.  Moreo-
ver, and consequently, the making and unmaking of law falls within the
exclusive province of the legislature.  As a result, where the legislature’s dic-
tates run up against custom, tradition, or even nature herself, there is little
question about which prevails.  While the positive law, under those condi-
tions, has a way of growing more predictable and understandable, it also has
a way of becoming tyrannical, reflecting little more than the arbitrary will of a
simple majority, perfectly willing to run roughshod over the desires—and,
indeed, the rights—of the unfavored minority.
94 Those volumes were (1) the Codex, which contained the rules themselves, (2) the
Digest, a collection of juristic commentary on the rules, and (3) the famous Institutes, which
combined the first two volumes in abridged form for those wishing to study the law. See
TAMANAHA, supra note 89, at 13.
95 See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION (C.K. Ogden ed., Richard Hil-
dreth trans., 1931) (1802).
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E
Contrast the common law.  Its main advantage lies in its adaptability, its
ability to supply the rational, flexible, and just principle appropriate to each
case—though not “supply” in the sense of “make out of nothing.”  After all,
in the old understanding, the common law’s existence was antecedent to any
given case.96  It was the job of the learned common-law judge simply to iden-
tify the governing principle that governs X or Y case and apply it.  A second
advantage of the common law is that, as the locus of a polity’s fundamental
law, it is at least theoretically capable of containing the tyrannical impulses of
bare legislative majorities and government actors generally.  As Sir Edward
Coke’s celebrated opinion in Dr. Bonham’s Case explained,
[I]n many cases, the common law will controul acts of parliament, and some-
times adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an act of parliament is
against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be per-
formed, the common law will controul it, and adjudge such act to be void . . .
[for] some statutes are made against law and right . . . .97
One easily perceives this view’s vulnerability to a Rule-of-Law critique.
Indeed, one rightly raises an eyebrow at the suggestion that the Rule of Law
does best in a system where eternal, abstract “rules of reason” fall fortuitously
from the sky into the laps of judges to be invoked in the service of voiding a
statute of the popular government.  Civil-law regimes may undermine the
Rule of Law by making the legislature supreme, but perhaps common-law
systems do just as poorly by creating a kind of black-robed aristocracy, the
only “predictable” feature of which is that the judges will have their way in
every case.
IV. MODERN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN CONCEPTIONS OF THE RULE OF LAW
In the interest of time, let’s skip over several important thinkers to say a
brief word about the Rule of Law as understood by John Locke, Baron de
Montesquieu, and the American Founders.
A
Beginning with Locke, we begin to see the development of the funda-
mentally liberal conception of the Rule of Law, the version most familiar to
us today.  In this account, the Rule of Law is the sole condition upon which
96 See generally OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1–38 (1923) (discuss-
ing the various origins and development of the modern common law).
97 Dr. Bonham’s Case, in 4 THE REPORTS OF SIR EDWARD COKE, KNT. 355, 375 (The
Lawbook Exch., Ltd. 2002) (1826).  As Tamanaha explains,
The basic idea was that the common law, a body of private law reflecting legal
principles, established the fundamental legal framework.  Legislation, from this
standpoint, posed a threat to the integrity and coherence of the common law—
enactments in derogation of the common law were therefore strictly construed by
judges.
TAMANAHA, supra note 89, at 57.
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political society depends.  To put it in prosaic terms, it is the societal deal-
maker, and its neglect, the societal deal-breaker.  Emerging from the state of
nature, men come together to agree to be bound by a set of rules, and so
long as those rules have force and give due regard to natural rights and the
public good, the arrangement persists.98  Consequently, “[w]herever law
ends, tyranny begins.”99  The late Lord Thomas Bingham, former Lord Chief
Justice of England and Wales, articulated a similar understanding of the
Rule-of-Law principle, defining it to mean that “all persons and authori-
ties . . . whether public or private, should be bound by and entitled to the
benefit of laws publicly made, taking effect (generally) in the future and pub-
licly administered in the courts.”100
For Montesquieu, the limiting function was best accomplished by a for-
mal division of government powers—legislative, executive, and judicial.  It is
Montesquieu’s rationale for cabining and defining the judicial power that we
ought to consider most directly.  On that subject, he warns that, should the
judicial power ever be mixed with that of the executive, “the judge might
behave with violence and oppression.”101  Likewise, were the judicial power
to combine with that of the legislature, “the judge would be then the legisla-
tor” and there would be “no liberty.”102  As Professor Judith Shklar once
wrote, the reason Montesquieu favors stripping judges of all power save those
properly called “judicial” is “not so much to ensure judicial rectitude and
public confidence, as to prevent the executive and its many agents from
imposing their powers, interests, and persecutive inclinations upon the judi-
ciary.”103  Made independent, “[t]he magistrate can then be perceived as the
citizen’s most necessary, and also most likely, protector.”104
This is not to say that a formal separation of powers is a necessary condi-
tion of the Rule of Law everywhere.  In theory at least, so long as each state
actor in a political system carries out his obligations in strict accordance with
98 Thus, as Locke put it,
[T]he community comes to be umpire, by settled standing rules, indifferent, and
the same to all parties; and by men having authority from the community, for the
execution of those rules, decides all the differences that may happen between any
members of that society concerning any matter of right; and punishes . . .
offences . . . with such penalties as the law has established . . . .
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 46–47 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett
Publ’g Co. 1980) (1690).
99 Id. at 103.  For Locke, the Rule-of-Law principle was important not just as a basis of
the social contract.  It was also essential for ensuring predictability and controlling the
governing authorities’ own behavior, so “that both the people may know their duty, and be
safe and secure within the limits of the law; and the rulers too kept within their bounds.”
Id. at 73.
100 TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAW 8 (2010).
101 1 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 152 (Thomas Nugent trans., Colo-
nial Press rev. ed. 1900) (1748).
102 Id.
103 Judith N. Shklar, Political Theory and the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW 1, 5 (Allan
C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan eds., 1987).
104 Id.
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the law, then whether the fundamental law assigns him some measure of
both the executive and the legislative power (as opposed to just one or the
other) makes little difference.  Still, because the potential for lawlessness in
those circumstances is especially acute, prudence dictates that powers be sep-
arated.  This was the position not only of John Adams, codified in Article 30
of the Massachusetts Constitution,105 but also of James Madison in Federalist
Papers 47 and 51.  The separation of powers, he argued, acts as a structural
safeguard against the natural, wayward inclinations of men—who, Madison
reminds us, are not angels, when he writes,
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. . . . It may be a reflection
on human nature that such devices should be necessary to control the
abuses of government.  But what is government itself but the greatest of all
reflections on human nature?  If men were angels, no government would be
necessary.  If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal con-
trols on government would be necessary.106
In other words, man being what he is (and this indeed is the foundational
premise), “[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judici-
ary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether heredi-
tary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition
of tyranny” and thus anathema to the Rule of Law.107
B
Turning our attention to the American Founders generally, inspired in
no small part by Locke’s and Montesquieu’s teachings, we find the cleanest
expression of the American conception of the Rule of Law in the Declaration
of Independence and in the Constitution itself.  On its face, of course, the
Declaration seems a rather anti-Rule-of-Law document.  After all, can there
be any doubt that at the time that document was authored, the American
people were under the rule not only of the British Crown but of the laws of
Parliament?  True, one could argue that King George III’s excesses bordered
on the despotic and therefore lacked legitimacy.  But what of the laws of the
people’s branch?  Passed by a republican body representing the interests of
the colonists, how could the validity of those laws have been thrown into
doubt?  The Declaration supplies the answer.  And, here, we begin to tease
out the substantive features, if you will, of the Rule of Law, the requirements
of which are written in “Nature” by “Nature’s God.”  According to the Decla-
ration, nature supplies a fundamental law of its own.108  Under that law, any
man-made provision—however legitimate when first promulgated—that
becomes “destructive” of man’s natural rights over time requires either alter-
ation or abolition.109  That provision, the Declaration suggests, loses its
105 MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXX.
106 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 319 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
107 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 298 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
108 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
109 Id. para. 2.
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moral force.  Plainly, this is a kind of Rule-of-Law argument: if nature’s law by
necessity must always rule, then man-made laws running to the contrary are,
to use a lawyer’s term, “preempted.”
Consider the analogous reasoning of the Constitution.  Authorized by
the rule of Nature and Nature’s God, the American people separated them-
selves from the British polity and established their own regime, the bedrock
of which became the Constitution of the United States.  For this reason, we
often say that the Constitution is our “fundamental law,” and, of course, that
must be right.  It creates the very possibility that power, at the national level
anyway, may be exercised.  This is true even as a matter of logic—one need
not invoke the Supremacy Clause to enhance the point’s validity.  Alexander
Hamilton proved this in Federalist 78.  There, addressing the province of the
judicial branch, he argued that “[t]he complete independence of the courts
of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution.”110  Answering the
argument that the power of judicial review would elevate the courts above the
legislative branch, Hamilton reminded his readers of the source of the Con-
stitution’s power when he wrote,
No legislative act . . . contrary to the Constitution[ ] can be valid.  To deny
this, would be to affirm that the deputy is greater than his principal; that the
servant is above his master; that the representatives of the people are supe-
rior to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers, may do
not only what their powers do not authorize, but what they forbid.111
By this reasoning, “[a] constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the
judges, as a fundamental law.”112
For Hamilton, Jefferson, and many of their colleagues, then, the Rule of
Law meant first the rule of fundamental law.  That meant, for one thing, rule
subject to the traditional, inherited common law rights of Englishmen.  Find-
ing myself here in London, I should take this occasion to admit that we
Americans often forget the debt we owe to Great Britain for these privileges.
The philosopher Russell Kirk helpfully reminds us of their importance when
he wrote that the Founders later sought to
110 Limitations in the fundamental law, he argues “can be preserved in practice no
other way than through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare
all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void.  Without this, all the reser-
vations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.” THE FEDERALIST NO.
78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
111 Id. at 466.
112 Hamilton goes on to write,
It therefore belongs to [the judiciary] to ascertain its meaning as well as the
meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body.  If there
should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has
the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other
words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the
people to the intention of their agents.
Id. (emphasis added).
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chiefly put down on paper what already existed and was accepted in public
opinion: beliefs and institutions long established in the colonies, and drawn
from centuries of English experience with parliaments, the common law and
the whole complex social order.  Respect for precedent and prescription
governed the minds of the founders of this republic.  We appealed to the
prescriptive liberties of Englishmen.113
At the same time, though, the Founders also appealed to the rights of
man as such—natural rights.  To the end of securing those rights, and acting
within nature’s authorization, the American people proceeded to set up a
fundamental law.  But note that the fundamental law “rules” in no meaning-
ful sense when the very government actors it brings into being perform acts
forbidden by it.  The fundamental law does rule, however, when, even though
the government has by a certain act trespassed its limits, the judiciary—exer-
cising the duty vested in it by that same document and, by extension, the
people—steps in and declares the trespassory act to be what it is: a nullity.
C
Before concluding, let’s tie my all-too-brief overview of the Rule of Law,
historically understood, back to the World Justice Project’s Index.  You’ll
recall that we flagged several concerns with that list.  Perhaps we ought now
to reassess two of them in light of what we’ve said since.  First, we observed
that the Index calls for the recognition of not only a set of basic process-based
rights (such as due process of law) but also a handful of individual, substan-
tive entitlements.114  The contemporary debate over whether the Rule of Law
requires only procedure or also substance, as the Index notes, ensues.  Still,
the historical understanding of the Rule of Law supports the Index’s general
approach, at least in principle—the principle being that the Rule of Law
does indeed call for the recognition both of procedural and substantive
rights.  We saw this idea surface in Aristotle’s account, which traces the neces-
sity of the Rule of Law to man’s rational, non-animalistic nature.115  As a
being who gives and demands reasons and acts in accordance with them,
man must be treated with a certain baseline level of dignity in any regime
that claims to respect the Rule of Law.  Consequently, it would be right to say
that a political system that lets you contest a parking ticket in three different
courts but that, on the same day, rounds up hundreds of citizens of a certain
color to put in preventive detention pays only lip service to the Rule of Law.
We also saw support for the notion that the Rule of Law has a substantive
component in the writings of the Founders and, in particular, the Declara-
tion of Independence.  As the American Founders saw it, the Rule of Law
means the rule of fundamental law, including the rule of nature.  Once a
regime fails to respect a citizen’s basic rights to life, liberty, and property—
113 Russell Kirk, The Best Form of Government, CATHOLIC WORLD, Oct. 1960, at 161.
114 See supra Section II.B.
115 See supra Section III.A.
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the Lockean rights116 reflected in  the Declaration—it becomes destructive
of the very ends for which it was constituted.117  Consequently, though the
higher law should rule, it does not.  Still, the hard question remains: Which
rights are indeed “natural” or “fundamental,” and who decides?  The Index
wades into this debate, in effect, by identifying a few privileges as essential
but neglecting others.  But disappointingly, it fails to articulate a theory to
account for its choices.  Perhaps the next Index will provide a more thorough
explanation.
Another feature of the Index that we highlighted is that it does not link
the Rule of Law to any one particular form of government.118  Indeed, on the
issue whether the “laws” it repeatedly describes are to be enacted by demo-
cratically elected representatives, the Index takes no side.  Once again, I think
this position at least in principle finds support in the history of the Western
conception of the Rule of Law.  Of course, Plato and Aristotle were far from
partisans of republican democracy.119  Even Locke and the American Foun-
ders stopped short of arguing that the Rule of Law presupposes some form of
constitutional republicanism.  Rather, their view was more nuanced.  They
argued that, given human nature and what history has taught us about it, the Rule
of Law is most likely to thrive where governmental powers are separated, the
people hold their leaders accountable in regular elections, and the powers of
the government are limited by a fundamental, written charter.120  For its
part, the Index also highlights several of these systemic features—including
the existence of a fundamental law, the separation of powers, and provision
for orderly transitions of power—as being most conducive to the Rule of
Law.  Instead of the particular form a government takes, what matters under
both the traditional and World Justice Project’s understandings of the Rule
of Law is that the state’s powers are limited in law and in fact.  On this point,
I believe the Index gets it exactly right.
V. THE RULE OF LAW AND THE UNITED STATES JUDICIARY
I want to conclude now with a reflection on the Rule of Law and the
United States judiciary.  Recall the words of Hamilton’s Federalist 78—that
“[a] constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges as, a funda-
mental law.”121  As the foregoing authorities have shown, we judges are
indeed essential to the maintenance of the Rule of Law.  At the same time,
we also pose a threat.  There is always the risk that, in our efforts to police the
116 LOCKE, supra note 98, at 66.
117 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
118 See supra Section II.B.
119 See Fred Miller, Aristotle’s Political Theory, STAN. ENCYC. OF PHILO. (Jan. 26, 2011),
plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-politics/ (“Aristotle classifies democracy as a deviant
constitution . . . .”).
120 See Suri Ratnapala, John Locke’s Doctrine of the Separation of Powers: A Re-evaluation, 38
AM. J. JURIS. 189, 219–20 (1993) (summarizing Locke’s view of separation of powers and
the fundamental requirement that government be subject to laws).
121 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 110, at 466.
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boundaries that the Constitution—and, by extension, the American peo-
ple—have erected, we will become overzealous, inventing constitutional
“rights” or enforcing restrictions existing only in our imaginations.  This ten-
dency, I submit, poses two threats to the Rule of Law.
First, and most obviously, it transforms Cicero’s conception of the judge
as neutral magistrate122 into Aristotle’s feared arbitrary monarch.123  In the
guise of upholding the Rule of Law, the legislator-in-robes ignores it and
enacts, in its place, his own view of the good.  This is all in spite of the plain
fact that the Constitution leaves those kinds of judgments to the elected
branches.124  Though Congress’s authority has limits, those limits do not
carve out a correlative policy-making role for the courts.  Instead, as the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments make clear, all powers not enumerated have
been retained by the people or the States.125  As Chief Justice Rehnquist
once explained, under our constitutional framework “[t]he people are the
ultimate source of authority; they have parceled out the authority that origi-
nally resided entirely with them by adopting the original Constitution and by
later amending it.”126  But unless Congress exceeds its limits, judges must
uphold and enforce its decisions, their own policy positions to the contrary
notwithstanding.127  Supposing that “the popular branches of govern-
ment . . . are operating within the authority granted to them by the Constitu-
tion, their judgment and not that of [judges] must . . . prevail.”128  Federal
judges are, after all, unelected and serve indefinitely.  These features are not
conducive to a policy-making role.129
122 See supra notes 81–85 and accompanying text.
123 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
124 Under Article I’s broad grant of authority, Congress enjoys the power to (among
other things) “lay and collect Taxes,” “borrow Money on the credit of the United States,”
“regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,” and to do any-
thing “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” the enumerated powers. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8.
125 Id. amends. IX–X.
126 William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
401, 404 (2006) (summarizing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)).
127 Article III, after all, confers on federal courts nothing more than the “judicial
Power.” U.S. CONST. art. III.  And, as Federalist No. 78 makes clear, that is a limited and
specific charge. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 110, at 466.  The “judicial Power,” as
Professor Philip Hamburger has explained, “was originally understood to mean essentially
what it had meant in England:  the power of courts to decide cases ‘in accord with the law
of the land.’”  Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, The Role of the Federal Judge Under the Constitution:
Some Perspectives from the Ninth Circuit, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 963, 964 (2010) (quoting
PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 17 (2008)).  It was not the power of courts to
resolve cases “according to [a judge’s] personal values or individual notions of justice.” Id.
128 Rehnquist, supra note 126, at 404.
129 As Judge Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit has put it, “our Constitution’s
design is to keep policymakers on short temporal leashes.  Judges don’t stand for election,
and it follows that they can’t adopt their own legislative proposals.”  Frank H. Easterbrook,
Judges as Honest Agents, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 915, 919 (2010).  Those who make
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The second problem with such judicial adventurism, as it pertains to this
topic, is that it undermines the predictability of law.  This is in no small part
because, often, when we judges are behaving as legislators, our proclama-
tions—heavy on general, ostentatious flights of rhetoric instead of only those
narrow, tightly written sentences necessary to resolve the case before us—
tend to create more questions than answers.  Justice Scalia described this
problem well in his 1989 article aptly titled The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules.
“Even in simpler times uncertainty has been regarded as incompatible with
the Rule of Law,” he notes.130  “Rudimentary justice requires that those sub-
ject to the law must have the means of knowing what it prescribes.  It is said
that one of emperor Nero’s nasty practices was to post his edicts high on the
columns so that they would be harder to read and easier to transgress.”131
We behave little better than Nero when it happens that, as a consequence of
our applying the latest theory of constitutional evolutionism hot off the aca-
demic presses, the only parties aware of what of our next ruling will spell are
the enlightened judges themselves.  As Justice Scalia writes,
What is it that the judge must consult to determine when, and in what direc-
tion, evolution has occurred? . . . As soon as the discussion goes beyond the
issue of whether the Constitution is static, the evolutionists divide into as
many camps as there are individual views of the good, the true, and the
beautiful.  I think that is inevitably so, which means that evolutionism is sim-
ply not a practicable constitutional philosophy.132
I close now with this thought.  Perhaps the best that we judges can do to
edify the Rule of Law in the United States—and in the world—is to carry out
our constitutional duty with precision, with impartiality, and with humility.
Let us do this so that, in words of Thomas Paine, “the world may
know . . . that The Law is King.”133
Thank you.
policy, moreover, “ought to have at least some connection with popular feeling.”  Rehn-
quist, supra note 126, at 406.
130 Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179
(1989).
131 Id.
132 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 45 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
133 THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 20 (H.D. Symonds 1793) (emphasis added).
